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Executive Order 10988 was signed by President John F.
Kennedy on January 17, 1962, This order established a program
for employee-management cooperation in the federal service.
Thus a new era in public personnel administration was opened.
His actions were hailed as a first step towards a viable en-
lightened management to be found in the new administration
,
The Kennedy Administration became known as the "New
Frontier," and a social revolution was developing within the
United States. The basis of this revolution was to be civil
rights and the dignity of man. It is perhaps fair to assume
that the promulgation of Executive Order 10988 was an extenuation
of the basic policies of the Kennedy Administration. However,
research indicates that this is not the whole story.
Over the years there had been much pressure on the
Congress to write legislation which would permit federal employees
to bargain collectively with their employer- -the Federal Govern-
ment. However, successive administrations were able to forestall
proposed legislation on the subject before it was enacted. In
the face of this stalling, pressure was building, and in 1961 it
appeared that there was enough strength within Congress to pass

such a bill. This bill would give employees in the public sector
many of the rights they were denied by the labor legislation
written to affect the v;orkers in the private sector.
In the summer of 1961 , President Kennedy appointed a Task
Force to study all aspects o£ the problem and make recommendations
for action. The Secretary of Labor, Arthur Goldberg, was made
Chairman of the Task Force and his close personal attention left
its mark on the report. Other high level members of the Task
Force were the Secretary of Defense and the Postmaster General.
Both of these agencies were employers of a considerable proportion
of the potential union members in the government's employment.
The Chairman of the Civil Service Commission was naturally in-
cluded in the Task Force and the Bureau of the Budget and the
White House were also represented
«
The Task Force worked diligently in a short period of
time. Perhaps their zeal was motivated by the impending legisla-
tion in Congress. In late November 1961, the Task Force submitted
their report to the President. They presented what amounts to a
novel plan and a feasible compromise between the principle of
collective bargaining and the realities of government employment.
The President accepted the findings of the Task Force and
Executive Order 10988 was signed and published on January 17,
1962. The program embodied in the Order was to be effective,
within the government, on July 1, 1962. This action, as
mentioned, ushered in a new era in labor-management relations in
the Federal service, and effectively headed off legislative action

It is no exaggeration to say that the Executive Order,
with the shift in policy it required of management, came as some-
thing with which management was not familiar. Certainly even the
mass of government employees were not aware of the implication of
the new program. Tinlike the change that took place in the 1930 '
s
in industrial labor relations in the private sector, the new
federal program was developed almost overnight. It did not emerge
from long experience and there were not many managers , within the
government , with the experience required to administer the program,,
The 1962 Order had some shortcomings but it produced some
excellent results, beneficial to both agencies and employees.
This has been acknowledged by virtually all concerned. At the
same time, there have recently been growing difficulties in pro-
gram operations and dissatisfaction on the part of both agencies
and unions due to the failure to adjust the policies of Executive
Order 10988 to changing conditions in the Federal labor-management
relations program.
Accomplishments in the program have been substantial.
The new policies have contributed to more democratic mancigement
of the workforce and marked improvement in communication between
agencies and their employees. Through labor-management consulta-
tion and negotiation, improved personnel policies and working
conditions have been achieved in a number of areas: the scheduling
of hours of work, overtime, rest periods and leave; safety and
industrial health practices; training and promotion policies;
grievance handling; and many other matters of significance to

employees and management. These gains have been achieved while
maintaining a labor-management atmosphere of reasonable harmony.
During the past seven years, the extent of union repre-
sentation has grown dramatically. From the 29 exclusive units in
TVA and the Department of Interior, covering about 19,000
employees, which existed prior to the Order, exclusive union re-
presentation has grown to 2,305 exclusive units in 35 agencies
covering 1,416,0/3 employees --52 per cent of the total federal
workforce is subject to the Order. Exclusive recognition now
covers 87 per cent of all postal employees, 67 per cant of wage
(blue collar) employees, and 28 per cent of salaried (white collar)
employees. Also, many thousands more have union representation in
1,087 units of Formal recognition and a similar number of Informal
units.
Federal agencies deal with 130 separate organizations
holding Exclusive or Formal recognition. Labor-management
agreements in force, excluding local agreements in the postal field
service, total 1,181 and cover 1,175,524 employees or 43 per cent
of the workforce. Over 800,000 employees have voluntarily
authorized payroll deductions for payment of their union dues, in
an annual amount in excess of $23,000,000.
With the great growth of union representation, it was the
opinion of both labor organizations and agency managers that
•HJ.So, Office of the President, Report and Recommendations
on: Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service , Pres ident •
s
Study Committee on Labor-Management Relations in the Federal
Service (Washington, D. C, August 1969), pp. 2-4. (Hereinafter
referred to as Study Committee Report:.)

significant changes were needed in program policies if the program
was to continue on a constructive course in the future. The size
and scope of labor-management relations activity today have pro-
duced conditions far different from those to which the policies of
the 1962 Order were addressed. There are difficulties in main-
taining appropriate distinctions in the rights accorded under
Exclusive, Formal, and Informal recognition, in dealing fairly with
disputes that occur in union organizing activity and in the
negotiation and administration of agreements, and in resolving
issues that arise because of the variety of agency policies
adopted under the decentralized arrangements provided by Executive
Order 10988
.
In the Report and Recommendations on Labor-Management
Relations in the Federal Service of August 1969 which was sub-
mitted by a Joint Committee made up of the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of Labor, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, and
Chairman, Civil Service Commission, it recommended changes to
Executive Order 10988 by publishing a new Order. It stated that
"the changes should remove many of the current causes ot agency
and union dissatisfaction and provide a framework for responsible
dealings by both sides in the future." It further stated that
the changes should 'deal only with deficiencies in the present
Order that need correction and weaknesses in operation that need
strengthening, for overall the program is healthy and thriving."
As a result of the recommendations of this committee, President
Nixon signed Executive Order 11491 on October 29, 1969.

Both Executive Orders established certain rules and
limitations, but still delegated to each agency considerable dis-
cretion to estab] ish and carry out a program for employee-manage-
ment cooperation in the way best suited to its own needs and the
needs of its employees. Commanding officers of activities employ-
ing civilians are given maximum practical authority to negotiate
policies end procedures which will be effective in dealing with
local conditions and problems. Where an employee organization
has been granted exclusive recognition, it is entitled to negotiate
a written agreement with management covering aspects of personnel
policy and working conditions that are within the discretion of
the Commanding Officer. The negotiation of a labor-management
agreement with an alert and well prepared employee organization
presents a real challenge. It also presents management with an
opportunity to establish a more meaningful and satisfying relation-
ship with employees and their representatives.
It is the purpose of this thesis to trace the growth of
unions in the Federal Government and at the Naval Supply Center,
Charleston, South Carolina, and to appraise the methods of
negotiating the union-management contract agreement as authorized
under Executive Order 10V88 at the Naval Supply Center Charleston.
The author's previous tour assignment was at the Naval
Supply Center Charleston with duties as Director of the Material
Department. During this time, he constantly dealt with the union
on ^^ day-by-day basis and as a result, played a key role in the
renegotiation of the new union-management contract agreement.

Of the 550 "blue-collar" employees in the Material Department,
500 were members of the Metal Trades Council (MTC), an affiliate
of the AFL-CIO. The initial contract agreement was signed in
March, 1967, and was renegotiated during the winter of 1963-1969.
This thesis will primarily cover actions taken just prior to and
during the renegotiation period. Even though several unions were
recognized at Naval Supply Center Charleston, this paper will only
cover activities involving the MTC.
Two methods of data collection have been employed in as-
sembling information to write this paper: case study and docu-
mentary analysis., The case study involves the contract negotiation
process at Naval Supply Center Charleston. The documentary
analysis involves a wide assortment of published and unpublished
material
.
In addition to covering the different aspects related to
contract negotiations, recommendations will be made on how to
improve the negotiation process which will apply to both the local




The labor movement originated in the guilds of the
medieval era and gained impetus during the Industrial Revolution,
Although labor organizations were initially banned by law, an
increasing tolerance was developed by society, so that by the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century the present-day pattern of
union activity and collective bargaining was well understood and
frequently accepted in relations between employers and employees
.
Local trade organizations got their start in the United
States as early as 1/90 and, as a result of various conditions,
political and economic, by I860 national unions began to develop
slowly. For the next forty years their growth was accelerated
with the mergence of the Knights ot Labor, Federation oi Organized
Trades and Labor, and the American Federation of Labor (A.F.L.)
which, in 1886, had a membership of 138,000 and doubled its size
during the next 12 years. In the following three decades in con-
solidated its position as the principal federation of American
unions until it had grown to two million members by 1916. During
World War I, membership jumped to four million, but after the war

dropped to three million members and reached a low of 2,1 million
in 1933.
1
Between 1932 and 1935 the passage of legislation favorable
to the unions set the stage for rapid expansion in the membership
of established unions and for organization of workers in many mass
production industries. This latter development led to jurisdictional
problems and ultimately resulted in the formation of the Congress
of Industrial Organizations (C.I.O.) in 1938.
Despite the split, both the A.F.L. and the C.I.O. continued
in growth. By 1941, their membership was estimated between ten
and eleven million and increased further during World War II. Then
there was a leveling off as the unions ran out of readily organi-
2
zable industries and occupations.
In 19i>3, the A.F.L. and C.I.O. were able to agree on a "no-
raiding" pact when they realized that they were not as far apart
as the initial controversies made it seem. This paved the way for
a reunion which took place in December, 1955, with the formation of
the A.F.L.-C.I.O. , with a total membership of about 14 million dues-
paying members. In 1951, however, about one and a half million of
these were lost when the Teamsters' Union and two other small
unions were expelled. In addition to these major unions, it is
estimated that various independent labor organizations had a
3
membership of 2.9 million.
kl.S., Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Brief History of the American Labor Movement, Bulletin 1000
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), pp. 4-6. (Here-
inafter referred to as Brief History.)
2IMd.# PP. 30-36. 3 Ibid. , pp. 46-48.
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Eight years after the merger, its organizing promise re-
mained largely unfulfilled. On the contrary, union membership had
declined, both in absolute terms and as a proportion of the labor
force. The forces at work making organizing more difficult or re-
ducing the number of union members included (1) the changing
composition of the labor force, that is, increasing numbers of
white-collar workers and decreasing numbers of manual 03: blue-
collar \-7orkers
, (2) the impact of technological change on existing
centers of organization, particularly the mass -product ion in-
dustries, and (3) a continuation of organization rivalries. Some
success at easing the latter obstacle, through coordinated organi-
zation campaigns in specific areas, was reported at. the 1963
AFL-CIO convent ion
.
In 1962, 181 national and international unions with head-
quarters in the United States had approximately 17.6 million
members, including about one million in areas outside tha United
States, primarily in Canada. One hundred and thirty AFL-CIO
affiliates accounted for 14.8 million members, and fifty-one
unaffiliated national unions had 2.8 million members. The member-
2
ship total was about 847,000 below the peak reached in 1956.
Unions in the Federal Service
Craft Unions
Employees in the Government's industrial activities
1Ibid., p. 54. 2 Ibid., p. 55
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(arsenals, Navy yards, printing plants) have been organized along
craft lines for many years. As early as the 1830s, certain crafts-
men, including carpenters, blacksmiths, and caulkers, organized
local craft groups
.
The Government craft unions conducted themselves in much
the same manner as their counterparts in private industry.
Government installations occasionally were the scenes of strikes,
as in the Philadelphia, Norfolk, and Washington, D. C. Navy Yards
and at the Rock Island Arsenal, As late as 1912, the Watertown
Arsenal was the scene of a strike by Government craft employees.
From 1861 to 1906, the Government Printing Office was a closed
shop in which only union members could obtain permanent employ-
ment. In 1906, President Roosevelt ordered that the "open shop"
be put into effect in that agency.
In the 1830s and 40s efforts of the craft unions were
directed primarily toward shortening the work day to ten hours and
then (after President Van Buren's Executive Order of 1840 granting
a ten-hour day) to eight hours with initial success dependent large-
v ly upon nearby prevailing practice in private industry (although
the first eight-hour day for certain workers went into effect in
a Government Installation).
In 1861, Government craft union leaders persuaded Congress
to enact the first of the "prevailing-wage" statutes. This was
modified the next year to permit greater flexibility. An 1862
lav; stated:
•'Chantee Lev/is, "The Changing Climate in Federal Labor





. . . that the hours of labor and the rates of wages of
the employees in the Navy Yards shall conform as nearly
as is consistent with the public interest with those of
private establishments in the immediate vicinity of the
respective yards, to be determined by the commandants of
the navy yards, subject to the approval of the Secretary
of the Navy.
While craft unions were established early in the Federal
Government, for some time the total strength of the membership in
these unions was not great. The number of unionized employees in
various crafts did not exceed 10,000 employees during the years
before the First World War. During that war, membership did not
exceed 2b, 000 Federal employees; in the 1920s and early 1930s,
membership fell back to less than 10,000 employees. It was not
until the late 30s when wage-board employment in the Federal
Government began to expand significantly, that craft unionism ex-
panded on an appreciable scale.
During the Second World War, when wage-board employment
reached a high of about 1,000,000 employees, craft union strength
reached an estimated high of about 2b0,000 Federal employees.
Membership has fluctuated since with changes in the level of wage
board employment."
The Postal Unions
In 1868, Congress adopted an eight-hour day law for Federal
"laborers, workmen and mechanics." Enactment of this lav/ was re-
garded as a victory for organized labor. It was also the signal
for other Government employees to strive for a similar work day.
Ibid.
, p. 65.
2 Ibid c , pp. 65-66.
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Many of these employees then worked ten or more hours , depending
on prevailing local practice. "Benefit associations" of letter-
carriers were among the first postal groups to engage in formal
efforts to secure an eight-hour-day law for their membership. In
1888, such a lav/ was passed. In working for its enactment it be-
came evident to letter carrier leaders that a continuing national
organization would be valuable in advancing their interests. Ac-
cordingly, the National Association of Letter Carriers was
formally established in 1889 as the first national postal union.
In 1917 it became affiliated with the American Federation of Labor,
The National Association of Letter Carriers has always been one of
the largest postal unions. Its membership was reported to be
11,000 in 189/; by 1941, it was 66,000; and the President's Task
Force on Employee-Mancigeraent Relations estimated 1961 membership
at 150, 000. X
The success of the National Association of Letter Carriers
in securing benefits for its members stimulated the interest of
other postal groups in unionization. Within a twenty-year period,
five more national unions of postal groups were formed out of the
nucleus of "benefit societies" and similar social organizations
of postal workers. These were the clerks, railway mail clerks,
rural letter carriers , and postmasters
.
The clerks were the second group of postal employees to be
formally organized. In 1889 they formed the United National
TU.S., brief History, pp. 11-13

14
Association of Post Office Clerks. A few years later, the
National Federation of Post Office Clerks (AFL) was organized
The National Federation, now the United Federation of Postal Clerks
(AFL-CIO) is the largest of the clerk organizations. The staff of
the Task Force on Employee-Management Relations estimated the 1961
membership as 14 b, 000.
In the early efforts to obtain improvement of pay and work-
ing conditions the postal union officers quickly learned that
their greatest potential for success lay in cultivating close re-
lations with key members of Congress. In 189b, the Postmaster
General, who vigorously opposed such relationships, issued the
first of the so-called "gag orders," decreeing that no postal
employee could testify before Congress on working conditions.
This prohibition was given more decisive and broader effect by
President Theodore Roosevelt who promulgated two Executive Orders,
one in 1902 and the second in 1906. These orders prohibited any
Federal employee or any organization of Federal employees from
lobbying in Congress. President Taft, in 1909, reaffirmed
President Roosevelt* s original decrees. In doing so he aroused
the ire of Congress by specifying, in addition, that Federal em-
ployees were not to "respond to any request for information from
either- House of Congress except through or as authorized by the
agency head concerned." The answer of Congress was to insert the
Lloyd-LaFollette Act of 1912 as a rider in the Post Office Depart-
ment appropriation bill. That act has remained the only signifi-
cant Federal statute on union-management relations in the Federal
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service (except for the prohibition of strikes). It reads in
pertinent part as follows:
(c) Membership in any society, association, club,
or other form of organization of postal employees not
aifiliated with any outside organization imposing an
obligation or duty upon them to engage in any strike,
or proposing to assist them in any strike, against the
United States, having for its objects among other things,
improvements in the conditions of labor of its members,
including hours of labor and compensation therefor and
leave of absence of any person or groups o£ persons in
said postal service, or the presenting by any such per-
son or groups of persons of any grievance or grievances
to the Congress or any Member thereof shall not consti-
tute or be cause for reduction in rank or compensation
or removal of such person or groups of persons from said
service,,
(d) The right of parsons emplo37ed in the civil
service of the United States, either individually or col~
lectively, to petition Congress, or any Member thereof,
or to furnish information to either House of Congress,
or to any committee or member thereof , shall not be
denied or interfered with.-1
This is the basis on which the right to join or refrain from join-
ing employee organizations has rested for postal employees and, by
extension, for all Federal employees. Also, it provides the in-
direct recognition that strikes against the Government are not
proper.
The General Unions
From about 1900 to 1.91 7 sporadic efforts were made to or-
ganize other Federal employees along occupational lines or for
particular purposes (e.g., to obtain retirement legislation) with
little general success. However, in 1917 the situation changed
when serious consideration was given by Congress to a proposal to




seven to eight hours (for a six-day week). Within a few months
general union membership in the departmental service increa
from a token membership to 11
;
.000. The fight against longer hours
led to the organization of the National Federation of Federal
Employees, formed in September, 1917, as an affiliate of the AFL.
The NFFE was a unique phenomenon on the Government scene
at the time because any Government worker, irrespective of trade
or occupation specialty, was eligible for membership, NFFE grew
rapidly in size. In 1920, there were 38 , 000 members; in 1935,
65, 000 j and by 1939, 75,000 members. Claimed membership in 1960
was 53,000,
NFFE's early efforts were directed toward supporting and
strengthening elements of the Federal civil service system. NFFE
pressed vigorously for the enactment of the Civil Service Retire-
ment Act of 1920, It also took a strong position on behalf of a
Federal classification system. After the Classification Act of
1923 was enacted, NFFE urged its extension to the field services.
Its offices cooperated with Congress and Government agencies in
study of the problems involved,
NFFE's efforts were opposed by the AFL national organiza-
tion, its parent group. The parent organization regarded position
classification as a threat to established apprentice- journeyman
standards and believed that if position classification methods
were widely adopted by the Federal Government, private industry
1Ibid ., pp. 17-20.
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would follow the example. After heated debate in the 1931 AFL
convention, NFFE split with its parent body*
AFL national felt it desirable to continue to represent
the interest of general Government workers in its ranks and
chartered the American Federation of Government Employees in 1931,
as an affiliate. AFGE had 18,000 members in 1936; in 1940,
30, 000 o Its cl^ira in 1960 was for 70,322 members. AFGE, like its
older rival, has concerned itself with extension of. the civil
service system, and with strengthening certain of its elements.
In its early days, AFGE was beset with internal conflicts
which in 1937 led to a further split and the creation of United
Federal Workers, which was chartered by CIO. In 1946, the UFW
combined with the State, County and Municipal Workers of America,
also CIO, to form the United Public Workers of America., A total
membership of 75,000 was claimed at the time of the merger. In
1950 it was expelled from CIO national on the grounds of failure
to eliminate communists from positions of influence within the
organization. UPWA has now vanished from the Federal union scene.
UPWA activities had a pronounced effect upon public
employer- employee relations. Its constitution has a provision of
strike procedure and, although the union leadership vigorously
denied that the provision in question applied to its FEDERAL
chapters, the reaction of Congress was swift. Riders were attached
to appropriation bills prohibiting payment of salary or wages of
employees belonging to organizations asserting the right to strike.
The Congressional furor over the alleged assertion by the UPWA
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of the right to strike against the Federal Government, coupled
with the fact that a number of its locals actually did strike
against city governments, led to the statement in the Taft-Hartley
Act which categorically denied the right to strike to all Federal
employees. Within a feu years following Taft-Hartley, ten State
legislatures enacted laws establishing the same policy for State
and local employees
•
Even though laws pirohibit strikes by Government employees,
on March 18, 1970, the postmen walked out on strike. It was the
first such walkout by Federal workers in the history of the United
States. For the first time, the Government was confronted with
the tactics used by labor unions against private enterprise- -a
crippling work stoppage. The President of the United States, like
any corporation president, found himself dealing with conflicting
demands and jealousies of rival labor leaders.
The wildcat strike of some 200,000 postal workers , which
began in New York City, spread through fifteen States, coast to
coast, paralyzing mail services in such cities as New York, Phila-
delphia, and Detroit. Embargoes on mail to strike-hit areas
caused gigantic pile-ups. Banks, businesses, public utilities,
and others dependent on normal mail operations were seriously
affected. Welfare recipients and persons whose paychecks are
sent by mail were among the victims. In economic terms, the toll
was high
.





carriers' pay runs from $6,176 to §8,442 a year. The top figure
is reached after twenty- one years on the job. The average yearly
base pay for the entire postal service is $7,475. The letter-
carriers demanded that the pay range be $8,500 to $11,700, with
the top pay being reached after five years . This meant a 40 per
cent increase.
A pay raise for the postal workers had been stymied in
Congress for months, because it was tied to a Presidential plan
for drastic reform of the whole postal service. The plan would:
1. Make the post office a TVA-like authority with a degree
of corporate autonomy
,
2. Wipe out postal deficits exceeding $1.3 billion by 1978.
3. Take promotions and appointments out of political control.
4. Improve wages and working conditions for the 750,000
employees
.
5. Assure reliable "first-class" mail delivery at a cost
that would be kept under control by sophisticated technological
2
advances financed in an even- paced way through public debt issues
The strikers defied Federal law, court injunctions and
the back- to-work pleas of their own leaders. On March 23, the
President declared a national emergency and mobilized 24,000
troops to move the mail, an unprecedented action On March 25,
the Postmaster General, satisfied that postal workers were
^•"Postal Strike—The Effect," U.S. News & World Report,
April 6, 1970, pp. 16-19.
2
"Untangling the Mess in the Post Office," Business Week
March 28, 1970, pp. 78-108.
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returning to work, began negotiations in Washington with union
leaders. Union negotiators reported that progress in the pay
talks satisfied their expectation of prompt and favorable results. '
The postal employees' walkout was an angry culmination of
their long discontent with labor relations in the Post Office, and
it reflected the general trend to more militant unionism in
government employment everywhere. Employee militancy in the
postal service has been increasing year by year, and either as
the cause of that or along with it, rank-and-file members of major
unions have been behaving like members of the big industrial
unions --pressing national leaders to be more aggressive, demand-
ing changes in work conditions, and particularly demanding "equity"
with unionists employed in private industry. Political infight-
ing over the postal bill before Congress brought this aggressive-
ness into sharp focus.
The President 's Task Force on
Employee-Management Rela t ions
The Task Force on Employee-Management Relations in the
Federal Service, which President Kennedy established in June,
1961, made an extensive study of the state of relations between
management and employee organizations in the Federal Government.




Status of Negotiation and Collective Bargaining
Among the smaller agencies which were conducting dealings
with employee organizations, such dealings usually took place
between individual employee organizations and management, each
organization dealing in behalf of its membership. Substantial
numbers of individual union locals were also dealt with indi-
vidually in the large agencies. For instance, the Treasury
Department was conducting dealings with eighty- seven locals of
different employee organizations, including locals of the AFGE,
the NFFE, established trade and craft unions affiliated with the
AFL-CIO, "employee councils," veterans groups, and special
independent organizations . The Department of the Navy was con-
ducting dealings with several hundred local employee organiza-
tions of various kinds, the Department of the Army with 253
organizations, the Air Force with more than 150 different
organizations, and the Panama Canal Company with thirty-six
different organizations of employees who were citizens of the
United States
.
Before 1945, in the Department of Interior formal
relations were l£\rgely confined to wage determination. In 1948,
a policy statement permitting collective bargaining was issued.
In 1959, a new statement introduced the policy of signing basic
and supplementary agreements between management and labor „ The
agreements contained provisions for use of mediation and arbi-
tration procedures where agreement was not reached in negotiation
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and for the use of arbitration in disputes growing out of the
application of agreements. The Secretary of the Interior
reserved the right to disapprove all arbitration or adjustment
awards
•
Need for Presidential Policy
In its report to the President, the Task Force stated:
At the present time, the Federal Government has
no Presidential policy on employee-management relations,
or at least no policy beyond the barest acknowledgment
that such relations ought to exist. Lacking guidance
the various agencies of the Government have proceeded
on widely varying courses. Some have established ex-
tensive relations with employee organizations; most
have done little; a number have done nothing. The Task
Force is firmly of the opinion that in large areas of
the Government we cire yet to take advantage of this
means of enlisting the creative energies of Government
workers in the formulation and implementation of policies
that shape the conditions of their work.^
Special Circumstances Affecting Federal
Employee-Management Relations
The Task Force found that the special circumstances af-
fecting Federal employee-management relations could be outlined
briefly as follows:
First, the public interest. Management's responsibilities
for efficient, economical, and timely action in the public
interest are paramount.
Second, the separation of powers and division of authority in
'-U.S., Office of the President, A Policy for Employee-
Management Coo peration in the Federal Service , President's Task
Force on Employee-Management Relations in the Federal Service
(Washington, D. C, November 30, 1961), pp. 1-12.
2 Ibid., p. 8.
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the Federal system limit the areas for dealing between an agency
and its employees. Many of the basic conditions of employment are
set by law and are not negotiable in the Executive Branch. The
President issues policies under his own authority which the m
merit of each agency must observe. Further, there are central con-
trol agencies whose functions cut across agency lines (e.g., the
Civil Service Commission, the Comptroller General, Bureau of
Budget)
,
Third, the merit system is the basis of Federal employment
practices and must be preserved . The statement of the President's
Task Force as to the impact of their recommendation on the merit
system is significant:
The Task Force wishes to note its conviction that
there need be no conflict between the system of employee-
management relations proposed and the Civil Service
merit system, which is and should remain the essential
basis of the personnel policy of the Federal Government,
The principle of entrance into the career service on
the basis of open competition, selection on merit and
fitness, and advancement on the same basis, together
with the full range of principles and practices that
make up the Civil Service system govern the essential
character of each individual's employment. Collective
dealings cannot vary these principles. It must operate
within their framework.
The Civil Service system has provided an excellent,
and, indeed, indispensable method of selecting govern-
ment employees and rewarding their achievements . How-
ever, it has not, on the whole, provided a means by
which employees acting in concert may promote the col-
lective interests of civil servants. In this light it
is clear that the systems are both mutually compatible,
and in fact complement each other. *




Cooperation- -Executive Order 10988
As a result of the Task Force Report, Executive Order
10988 was issued on 17 January 1962. This Executive Order, which
took all of the above-mentioned special considerations into ac-
count, established the framework for a program of employee-manage-
ment cooperation in the Federal service. It affirms as Presidential
policy that the participation of employees in formulation and im-
plementation of personnel policies is desirable and encourages
continuance and expansion of these practices. The Executive Order
also states as Presidential policy7 that:
Efficient administration of Government and well
being of employees require that orderly and constructive
relationships be maintained between employee organiza-
tions and management officials and that effective
employee-management cooperation requires a clear
statement of the respective rights and obligations
of employee organizations and agency management . ^
The Executive Order emphasizes the paramount importance
of the public interest, and it excludes from the scope of negotia-
tion all matters of lav/, policies set forth in the Federal Person-
nel Manual, and agency regulations. It reserves to management a
number of basic rights, e.g., the right to direct employees; to
take personnel actions, including disciplinary actions; to relieve
employees from duty because of lack of work or other legitimate
reasons; to maintain the efficiency of government operations; and
to determine the means by which such operations are to be
conducted
.
HjcS., President, Executive Order 10988, Employee-Manage-
ment Cooperation in the Federal Service, January 17, 1962, p. 1.
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The mission of an agency or activity, its budget, its
organization, the assignment of its personnel, and the technology
of performing its work are matters reserved for determination by
management. Further, the Executive Order specifically provides
that an agency of the Government shall be free "to take whatever
actions may be necessary to carry out the mission of the agency
in situations of emergency."
But aside from these basic rights, which management of-
ficials within the Executive Branch must retain in order to carry
out their public function, there are many aspects of employment
and working conditions in which Federal employees, individually or
as members of labor organizations, can participate in determining
personnel policy and practice through the vehicles of consultation
and negotiation.
Labor-Management Relations in the
Federal Government- -Executive Order 11491
On October 29, 1969, President Nixon signed into effect
Executive Order 11491 based upon the recommendations of a joint
committee as stated in their Report and Recommendations on Labor-
Management Relations in the Federal Service of August, 1969, The
new Order replaces the seven-year- old Executive Order 10983 and
covers 2.8 million Federal employees.
Although the Order continues the ban on employee strikes
and the union shop, it will require government unions to file
regular financial disclosure statements with the Secretary of
Labor, and to bond top officers who handle union funds.
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It states that government unions cannot bargain over wages
or hours, but they can negotiate contracts with agencies on work
and vacation schedules, overtime, safety and grievance procedures.
If agreement cannot be reached by the agency and union negotiators
,
either party can request binding arbitration. This would come
from an impasse panel appointed by the President. Future union
elections will be policed by the Labor Department, rather than by
individual agencies.
Executive Order 11491 also changes the types of recogni-
tion granted Federal unions, a move that will hurt, if not wipe
out, some of the small independent organizations. The system of
"informal recognition," given to even the smallest employee groups,
will be eliminated by July 1, 1970. "Formal" recognition, which
goes to a union with a 10 per cent membership in an agency or
unit, will be phased out by December 31, 1970. Exclusive recogni-
tion will be granted to unions that win a majority vote from
eligible employees within an agency or unit. Most of the major
agency exclusives are now held by AFL--CIO affiliates.
Supervisors and guards, under the new order, nuay only
belong to general membership unions. However, the unions cannot
bargain for them, and any benefits won for rank-and-file employees
will not go to supervisor personnel or guards
.
This Order also states that organization representatives
shall not be on official time when negotiating agreements with
agency management. Under Executive Order 10988 organization re-
presentatives were allowed to negotiate on Government time without
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any limitation unless specified in the negotiating schedule which
is usually drawn up prior to the commencement of negotiations.
It was the desire of the committee that the changes under
Executive Order 11491 be accomplished without serious disruption
to the present program. According to an employee relations re-
presentative in the Navy Department, the new Order has not caused
any problems in relation to those union agreements already in
effect. However, there are two areas causing problems in the
negotiations now underway. They are the stipulation that union
members will be "off the clock" while negotiating and the binding
versus advisory arbitration.
The unions do not want to bargain "off the clock"; there-
fore, they are insisting on bargaining after working hours . The
situations that have arisen so far have been worked out between
management and the union, usually along the line of half the
negotiations being conducted during the work day "off the clock"
and the other half after working hours
.
Executive Order 11491 does not state specifically that
arbitration must be binding. The committee's report stated that
"exceptions to £irbitrators ' decisions should be sustained only on
grounds similar to those applied by the courts in private sector
2labor-management relations."" The Navy Department feels that
this area is open to negotiation at the negotiating table.
^-Tom Garnett, Employee Relations Staff, Office of Civilian
Manpower Management, Department of the Navy, personal interview,
Vfoshington, February 25, 1970.
Study_Cqmmittee Report , p . 49.

CHAPTER III
IMPACT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 10983 ON THE NAVY
World War II accelerated efforts at cooperation in labor
relations areas within the defense establishment. By nou, unions
were fairly well organized; management had psychologically accepted
the rights of employees to join unions; and the Federal Government
had set a precedent of bargaining collectively in some agencies or
bureaus. In addition, the Army and Navy industrial establishments
had weathered some seventeen strikes or walkouts of varying lengths
before realizing that workers needed an outlet for negotiation and
effective communications when they felt that they had a serious
grievance.
Initially, the Navy was considered the most progressive
with its employee councils, but soon the Army, and later the Air
Force, followed suit, Both the Army and the Navy restricted super-
visor participation in their councils. In addition, the wage
boards of all three services gave employees the opportunity to
participate or consult with management. The degree of union par-
ticipation and membership continued to increase and, by 1961, the
Presidential Task Force reported that membership in the defense




members; Army 11 per cent, with 39,331 members; and Air Force
9 per cent, with 2.4,650 members.
A review of the history of employee-management relations
in defense agencies reflects that there has been a consistent in-
crease in the degree of employee participation with management.
However, tensions and inequities still exist « The First Hoove
Commission, in 1949, found that the Federal agencies were lacking
a "formal provision for the positive participation of employees,
both as individuals and in organized groups, in the formulation
2
and improvement of Federal personnel policies and practices."
With the growth of union strength in government and the
introduction of Federal laws covering union relations with private
industry (mainly the 193b Wagner Act revised by the Taft-Hartley
Act of 1947 and the Labor-Management Relations Act of 19b9) , along
with National Labor Relations Board decisions, it is not surprising
that more and more public employees were experiencing the con-
tagious influence of the movement. With the steady growth of total
government managing many "private industry" types of operations,
some people wondered why Federal employees, who are not engaged in
long-recognized "governmental functions," such as those in the De-
partment of Defense or the Department of State, should not come
under a Taft-Hartley type of procedure.
This apparent contrast in standards led to the introduction
Lewis, "The Changing Climate," p. 66.
2 Ibid., p. 67.
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of over thirty bills iu the 87th Congress (1961) relating to employee-
management relations in the Federal service. Each year this type
of legislation has been gaining support. Federal Personnel Manage-
ment had been aware of this since 1951 and had encouraged officials
to solicit and consider the views of their employees in formulating
personnel policy. However, there was never any Presidential policy
in the area that could serve as a guide for all ag< Thus, in
1961, the stage was set for an executive reappraisal of Federal-
labor policies.
In June 1961, President Kennedy appointed a special task
force, V7ith Arthur J. Goldberg who was Secretary of Labor at that
time, as its Chairman. A number of agencies indicated to the task
force a desire to maintain the status quo. Since the task force
found a problem did exist, this was not considered to be a
realistic solution. The task force discovered that labor relations
procedures varied widely between agencies; often excellent
national policies were established only to be ignored in the field,
and working conditions and hours were a greater problem than wages
.
Many agencies were completely unaware of the worker's viewpoint.
Existing grievance procedures were determined to be inadequate,
and the Navy's employee councils were reported to be little more
than "company unions," in some cases even doing more harm than good.
The Task Force Report indicated that some action was needed.
If the Executive Department did not move, it would be only a matter
of time before Congress would seize the initiative and legislate
in this area, possibly creating less flexible lav/s and eroding
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command prerogatives. Acting on task force recommendations,
President Kennedy, in January 1952, established a government-wide
policy acknowledging the legitimate role which employee organiza-
tions would have in forming and implementing personnel policies
and practices. The specific recommendations of the task force
were inco] porated in Executive Order 10938.
The objectives of Executive Order 10988 were to provide
for constructive employee-management relations , increase employee
participation, and to specify clearly union and management rights
and objectives. The principal sections of the Executive Order
embody the following:
1. In addition to defining employee rights, management is
required to maintain a neutral attitude concerning whether or not
its employees join unions
.
2. Guidance is provided should conflict of interest arise.
This involves key employees and supervisors whose responsibilities
to management may be incompatible with the duties associated with
holding union office, such as in the case of most supervisors.
3« A definition is given on what constitutes an employee
organization (union) in the Government. Only those organizations
whose primary purpose is the improvement of working conditions
qualify. Navy Employee Councils and veterans' organizations do
not qualify.
4. Criteria are established to be used for determining the
type of recognition to be given an employee organization. The
three types of recognition are: informal, formal, and exclusive.
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This is the heart oi the Executive Order. Official recognition
means status and is the major motivation for union leaders desiring
to enlarge their memberships. The first category, informal, is
granted to any acceptable employee organization. Then, if at
least 10 per cent of the members of the proposed appropriate unit
belong to one union, iormal recognition is granted. This does not
Secure the right to a written contract, but it doe? give the union
the right to be consulted on matters of interest to its members.
Management is obligated to seek the views of such unions from time
to time,
b. The requirements tor exclusive recognition and the deter-
mination of the appropriate bargaining unit are established. In
broad terms, this unit is determined on the basis of "an identi-
fiable community of interests among the employees concerned,"
This remained a controversial subject; it provoked many Navy
advisory arbitration hearings with management losing most of the
decisions. Too often the initial determination was made on the
basis of administrative convenience without considering all of the
crafts and trades involved. A union with formal status that
has 50 per cent or more of the members in the bargaining unit can
request exclusive recognition. When elections are necessary to
determine specific union membei'ship, the representative vote re-
quired is 60 per cent of those in the unit eligible to vote, and
the final selection is made by a majority of those voting. Ex-
clusive recognition entitles the union to sit down with management
and negotiate a written contract for all employees of the unit.
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6. Provision is made for unions with exclusive recognition to
negotiate agreements containing grievance procedures, providing
these procedures do not impair any rights already available to an
employee. In addition, advisory arbitration by a neutral third
party is authorized.
7. Limits are set on the official time and facilities that
may be used for union business. Grievances, in general , are con-
ducted on official time. Contract negotiations may be conducted
during off-duty hours at the request of the agency. In general,
using official duty time to conduct internal union business is
prohibited (soliciting members, dues, etc.)*
8. Procedures are described for deciding union and majority
status disputes. This is advisory arbitration which provides,
upon the request of" an agency or union, for the Secretary of Labor
to nominate one or more qualified arbitrators to handle disputes
involving the appropriateness of a unit. The Navy has had more
arbitration cases, as a result of union requests, than the other
services.
9. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) is the agency responsi-
ble for technical assistance in the training of management officials
in employee-management relations. This part of the Executive Order
also provides for a continuous study and review of the Federal
employee-management relations program.
10. The CSC and the Department of Labor have a dual responsi-
bility as specified for the standards of conduct and fair labor
practices. In addition, a watchdog committee composed of members
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of the original Presidential task force was set up. This comnu l
I
received complaints and reviewed the progress of collective b<
gaining.
11. The appeal rights of all Federal employees against the
adverse action of agencies were standardized. In the past, a
double standard existed between the rights of veterans and non-
veterans .
12. The last section sets forth that certain investigative
and intelligence agencies are exempted. Agency heads may suspend
the provisions of the Order, in the national interest, with re-
spect to installations or activities outside the United States,
Thus the Executive Order 10988 standardized employee-
management relations throughout the Federal Government. Though
the Navy's record in industrial relations had been fair, it had
certain weaknesses, such as a reluctance on the part of certain
commands to acknowledge unions as legitimate. The major short-
comings of past Federal labor relations were corrected by the
Executive Order while, at the same time, management retained the
initiative in personnel practices.
Executive Order 10988 experienced some rough water, but
an appraisal of its progress to date indicates that:
1« With the exception of small unions (150 or fewer members),
the quality of union and management leadership improved. Communi-





2, Exclusive agreements are leading to clearer statement!




(over 500 members) such as are found at shipyards, supply centers,
and air stations, are the employee organizations principally in-
volved with the exclusive recognition provisions.
3, The profile oi the type ot union that gained the most in
participation and membership was large craft units, such as metal
trades or maritime unions with exclusive recognition.
4, The principal problems reported by unions were conflict of
interest, hostile civilian supervisors, management too legalistic
or formal, the bargaining unit, limited knowledge of the Executive
Order, and limited bargaining areas* The principal problems re-
ported by management were need for additional training of new union
leaders, the extra workload, and the bargaining unit question.
It appears that the Executive Order met its objectives and
successfully ushered in a new era in employee-management co-
operation. Over-all progress has been of a positive nature.
Greater cooperation does exist with a probable increase in job
satisfactione The Executive Order met an important need by clari-
fying employee status and management policies. Improved coopera-
tion and communications between Federal managers and the employee
organizations proved to be a source of strength to the Naval Es-
tablishment and thereby increased the effective use of one of our




Implementation of Executive Order 10988
at Naval Supply Center Charleston
Prior to Executive Order 10988, regulations permitted
establishment of an Employee's Council consisting of nonsupervisory
employees. At the Naval Supply Center (NSC) Charleston, the un-
graded or blue collar employees voted for the establishment of an
Employee's Council while the graded or classified employees voted
against it The purpose of the Council was to meet periodically
with management and present problems which usually related to work-
ing conditions or safety. Management would review and consider
items submitted in an effort to resolve the problems to the satis-
faction of all concerned e
After Executive Order 10988 was signed, the ungraded
employees were first to organize under the provisions of the Order.
The Metal Trades Council (MTC) was the primary organization which
took the initiative in soliciting membership., They first gained
informal recognition during the later part of 1962, This was
relatively easy to obtain. They had to submit the following in-
formation to the NSC Commanding Officer, who then granted
recognition:
1. A roster of the organization's officers and other repre-
sentatives |
2. A copy of the organization's constitution and by-laws and
a statement of its objectives!
3. A statement that the employee organization is in compliance
with the Standards of Conduct t
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4. A statement chat the organization does not assert the
right to strike against the Government;
b. A statement that the organization does not advocate the
overthrow of the constitutional form of government;
6. A statement that the organization has no rule, procedure,
or ritual which permits discrimination because of race, creed,
color, or national origin; and
7. A statement that the organization is not subject to
1
corrupt influences.
Once informal recognition was granted, the MTC immediately
began working on formal recognition,, To gain formal recognition,
the organization must have no less than 10 per cent membership
of the total civilian employees in the unit. When acceptable
evidence of membership is presented to and approved by the Command-
ing Officer of the activity, the organization is granted formal
recognition The MTC received formal recognition at NSC
Charleston during the early part of 1964.
The next goal for the MTC was exclusive recognition. To
gain exclusive recognition, the MTC had to show that it had:
1. A majority membership in the unit; or
2. A minimum of at least 10 per cent membership and a suf-
ficient number of authorization C6irds to total in excess of 50
per cent of the eligible employees in the unit; or
hJ.S., Civil Service Commission, Navy Civilian Personnel
Instruction /21, December 24, 1964, Washington, D. C, p. 5.
(hereinafter referred to as NCPI/21.)
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3. A total oi at least 30 per cent support within the
unit to justify an election.
The final determination is the responsibility of the
Commanding Officer. If he feels that the organization has sup-
port of at least 50 per cent of the unit, an election need not be
held. An election was held at NSC Charleston but not until the
union worked hard on membership drive which lasted many months
.
They finally won exclusive recognition during the Spring of 1966,
some two years after receiving formal recognition.
A union granted exclusive recognition can request that a
written agreement be negotiated. The HTC made such a request and
contract negotitations began in June 1966. The first meeting set
the tempo for the entire negotiating period. The union negotiating
team walked out of the meeting a few minutes after it started
because of the seating arrangement around the table. They started
negotiating again after a one week "cooling off" period, but the
negotiations were halted many times for similar insignificant
reasons. Since the union negotiating team was "on the clock,"
there was no real incentive for them to conclude the negotiations
as soon as possible. An agreement was finally completed nine
months later and signed in March, 1967.
The agreement was for a two year period. During this time,
many weaknesses in the agreement became apparent. Such vague
statements as "each union steward will be granted a reasonable
1Ibid . t p. 6.
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amount of time during his work day to conduct union business"
led to problems between the union steward and his supervisor.
Actually the union stewards were spending practically all their
time on "union business" and not on the job. Another big problem
was that the supervisors did not see the agreement until after it
was signed. Many things had been agreed to which the supervis<
felt were impossible to live with. As a result, the supervisors
were not anxious to v/ork with the union and a multitude of
grievances were generated by the employees. Many grievances were
submitted at the suggestion of union stewards in an attempt to put
the supervisors on the spot. The general feeling was that the
agreement was very poor and that major effort would be put forth
to generate a much better agreement when it was renegotiated.
Tom Hamilton, Staff Assistant to the Material Department
Director, Naval Supply Center Charleston, South Carolina, Personal




NEGOTIATIONS AT NAVAL SUPPLY CENTER CHARLESTON*
The two year period under the 196 7 MTC contract ag]
was a difficult time for management at NSC Charleston. Many
grievances were submitted by the employees, most of which were
submitted at the request oi the union stewards.
A grievance is submitted when a verbal complaint by an em-
ployee is not solved by the supervisor to the satisfaction of the
complaining employee. The grievance is submitted in writing to
the department head who must reply in writing. The department
head will hold a hearing before he makes his decision. The next
step, if a satisfactory solution has not been reached, is the Com-
manding Officer. Another hearing is held and another decision is
passed down in writing. If the employee is still unhappy, the
grievance can go to arbitration where an impartial individual will
hold a hearing and pass down his decision. The arbitrator's de-
cision can be either advisory or binding, whichever was agreed to
during the contract negotiations.
"This chapter was written based upon the experiences of
the author while assigned to NSC Charleston, and interviews held
with Lieutenant Commander Robert K. Berg, who, while assigned to




Grievances were submitted at the rate of three per weeki
About three-fourths went to the second step and one-fourth to the
third step, the Commanding Officer. Only three ever went as far
as arbitration. To reduce the large number of grievances and save
some management time, the Commanding Officer decided to '"'open his
door" to the union officials. He felt that he could solve some of
the problems himself and talk them out of many other ideas for
which they had been submitting grievances. He was right in that
the number of grievances decreased? however, the supervisors be-
came extremely unhappy. Their decisions were being overturned by
the Commanding Officer without any prior discussion with him. Of
course the union was happy to have access to the Commanding Office]
They took full advantage of it, which resulted in many gains for
them. This unsatisfactory situation continued until a new Command-
ing Officer arrived in the Fall of 1968. His first word to the
union was that his door was not open to them and that he wanted
them to abide strictly by the contract agreement. The union was
unhappy again.
Management was generally "fed-up" with the union and felt
very little benefit was being gained based upon the many hours of
time being spent on union matters. The militancy in the union was
growing and the cry of unfair labor practices was being heard more
and more. The new Commanding Officer recognized that, something
had to be done before the situation got completely out of hand.
He felt his best approach to solving the problem was to ensure
that the new contract agreement, which was due to be renegotiated
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soon, was written in a way that the many weaknesses of the old
contract were eliminated,,
In preparation for the renegotiations, he first had the
Employee Relations Staff review all grievances submitted during
the previous two years and then summarize the problems . After
studying the problems, it was felt that they were generated as a
result of the following weaknesses in the original contract
agreement
:
1. The contract required two weeks notice to change an
employee's work schedule; therefore, there was no flexibility in
the establishment of workshifts or workweeka.
2 e The contract restricted the type of work employees could
be assigned (clean-up was strictly for janitors).
3« Supervisory authority was undercut by allowing the union
stewards to go directly to higher management.
4. Military supervisors' authority was eroded by requiring
them to deal through civilian supervisors on all matters.
5. Overtime was made an option of the individual when re-
quested by management, rather than a requirement under the rights
of management.
6 e Union personnel were given unrestrained and unaccounted for
liberty to conduct union business.
/. The union was allowed to sit in on selection and promotion I
panels
.
8. The union was given an authoritative role in safety matters
in that employees were not required to work on a job until the
union stated that it was safe.

43
9. The employee's rights of privacy were abrogated by the
i : ' ty of a union official being present any time an ei
was called in to talk to his supervisor.
10c The union was allowed to pursue grievances after the em-
ployee was satisfied.
After the above major weaknesses had been submitted to
the Commanding Officer, he decided that his next objective was to
name a negotiating team that could come up with his desired re-
sults. As chief spokesman, he picked his executive officer, a
Navy Captain. Three other key members weire a Lieutenant Commander
who had worked in the Material Department, the administrative as-
sistant to the Director of the Material Department, a GS-11, who
had been a member of the first negotiating team, and the head of
the Employee Relations Staff, also a GS-11. This was considered
the strongest possible negotiating team that management could
assemble within NSC Charleston
•
The Prene^otiation Agreement
Approximately forty-five days prior to the commencement
of cont3;act negotiations, the president o± the Charleston MTC met
With the assistant head spokesman for management to discuss the
negotiating schedule and the ground rules. After agreeing upon
the terms of negotiating, an agreement was signed by both parties.
Management was anxious to get a good prenegotiation agree-
ment because they felt that the success of the contract negotiations
was dependent upon several rules proposed by management. The
primary one was the period of time management would allow the
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union members to negotiate "on the clock." Since the first con-
tract took nine months to negotiate, management wanted to make sure
this did not happen again. It was finally agreed that the union
negotiators would go "off the clock" three months after the start
of negotiations if an agreement had not been reached by that time.
Another rule management felt was important was that no un-
definable words or phrases should be used in the contract. The
old contract was full of undefinable terms and the correction of
this was considered to be one of the objectives with the highest
priority.
It was agreed that management and the union could each
have one observer. This provided adequate representation and was
not so large a group which would have a tendency to slow down
progress.
The designation of a space for the negotiations and caucus
arrangements was left to the desires ot management. Management's
reason for wanting this right was directed primarily at naming the
location for union caucuses. During the first contract negotiation,
the union used the request for caucus to get out of negotiations
and disappear. This to management was merely a delaying tactic.
This time management would designate a space adjacent to the ne-
gotiating room for all union caucuses.
Other items outlined in the prenegotiation agreement were
the schedule of negotiation sessions, the order in which subjects
to be discussed would be taken up, the procedure for the initialing
and setting aside the portions of the contract as the language was
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worked out to the mutual satisf action of both parties, and
methods to be used in identifying and attempting to resolve any
potential deadlocks which might develop. Management was success-
ful in getting all elements in the prenegotiation agreement which
were considered essential to achieve their goals during the
actual contract negotiations.
Negotiable and Nonnegot iable I tems
Matters generally appropriate for negotiation are stated
as follows in the Navy Civilian Personnel Instructions:
Matters appropriate for negotiation with recognized
employee organizations are policies and programs related
to working conditions, including but not limited to such
matters as safety, tinning"? labor-management cooperation,
employee services, methods of adjusting grievances , ap-
peals, leave, promotion plans, "demotion practices, pay
practices, reduction- in-force practices, and hours of
work.
Maters not negotiable are stated as follows:
Areas of discretion and policy such as the activity's
mission, budget, organization, assignment of personnel,
or the technology of performing its v/ork.-
is a subtle one. For example, management has the right "to pro-
mote" and unions have the right to negotiate certain aspects of
"promotion plans." The first right--to promote- -refers to the
adv£incement of a single individual. "Promotion plans" refer to
the command's plans and procedures by which all employees in a
unit will be considered for promotion and, as such, it is a ne-
gotiable item.
XNCPI 721, Section 6-2a, p. 8
?
'Ibid. , Section 6-2b, p. 8.
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A second example is that management has the "right" to
"maintain efficiency" of operations. Management can replace ten
workers with a machine if it is more efficient. The union, however,
has the right to negotiate the question of what will happen to the
replaced employees --who, when, and in what order.
A third example is that management has the "right" to
"assign" employees to specific jobs including overtime jobs,
menial jobs, and dirty jobs. The union has the "right" to
negotiate concerning the procedures followed by management when
employees are "assigned" to these tasks.
The following is a list of negotiable items discussed and
included in the union contract at NSC Charleston!
1, Recognition and unit description.
2. Rights of management.
3c Grievance and appeal procedures.
4. Annual leave procedures.
5. Procedures for assigning overtime.
6. Sick leave procedures.
7. Procedures for handling disciplinary actions.
8. Assignment of work details.
9. Civic responsibilities.
10. Parking privileges.
11. Reduction- in-force plans.





15. Merit promotion policies and plans
o
16c Training and employee development.
17. Holiday work.
18. Committee membership.




21. Orientation of new employees.
22
„
Use of official time for consultation and/or negotiation.
23. Apprentice programs.
24. Transportation arrangements.






29. Equal opportunity practices.
30. Medical considerations.
31. Food service facilities.
32. Working environment.




35. Union office space.
36. Withholding of dues.
The above list is an example of the broad scope of what
was negotiated. Actually, any matter that falls within the Com-
manding Officer's discretion is subject to negotiation. This
includes many, many items.
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Management Preparation and Review Cycle
Management began preparations for the negotiations approxi-
mately thirty days prior to the negotiation starting date.
Management felt that the best approach was to begin preparations
with the people who, in the final analysis, would be most directly
affected by the contract on a day-to-day basis—the first line
supervisor. The supervisor is the person who must resolve employee
problems 8 He is in daily contact with the employees and their
union steward* He is the man who approves the lecwe, assigns the
daily work, knows the working conditions in the office, warehouse,
and shop. The supervisor is the one who is helped or hampered by
what is finally agreed upon at the bargaining table and printed in
the contract. Since the supervisors did not know what was in the
first contract until after it was signed, which caused major pro-
blems, management exerted maximum effort to make sure the super-
visor was not overlooked this time.
Preparations began in the Personnel Office with an in-depth
review of all grievances which had been filed during the contract
period and a review of all meetings and correspondence held re-
lating to dealings between management and the union. This review
proved quite useful in highlighting those areas of personnel
policy and those sections of the contract which had created pro-
blems in the past and would be probable discussion topics at the
bargaining table
„
Additional research was conducted by personnel in the
Personnel Office on the effect of any changes in the current
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personnel instructions on the various negotiable personnel
policies. Copies of all recent Navy contracts negotiated with the
MIC at other activities were studied to review any trends that
might be included in the MTC's demands at Charleston.
At the same time these reviews were taking place in the
Personnel Office , meetings were held with all the first level
supervisors. These meetings consisted of a page-by~page review of
the old contract to list problems which had resulted from various
sections of the old contract during the past two years. These
meetings also served as a sounding board for the supervisors to
make suggestions on changes , modifications, and new provisions
which they i\'ould like to see management shoot for in the new
contract
,
These supervisory meetings were considered absolutely es-
sential to the entire preparation cycle, as it is from these meet-
ings that the building blocks for management's position are first
formulated One point was made clear from the outset and repeated
at regular intervals. Just because the supervisors and senior
echelons of management advance certain proposed changes and modi-
fications, it was no guarantee that all such changes would be in
the contiact. The negotiations consist of a series of compromises
with each party getting less than they originally hoped for. It
is simply not possible at the bargaining table that both sides
will see every issue in the same light. Both parties will be
doing their very best to secure that contract wording which will
best serve their interest, and all participants in the planning
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and preparation cycle must always be prepared to accept the fact
that some of the sections they most want to get in the contract
will not be possible.
Exhibit IV -1 depicts the steps taken by roanagei?,ent in pre-
paration to renegotiate the contract with Charleston MTC and the
following is a detailed discussion of the action taken during each
step:
Step One-' All supervisory personnel of the unit employees
attended two separate meetings as the initial step e These meetings
served several purposes:
lo A page-by- page review of the old contract to isolate any
previous problems and develop potential modifications desired by
first line supervision.
2c A sounding board for supervisors.
3. A means for retraining supervisors on contract provisions
and philosophy ot labor-management relations.
4. A means for fully involving supervisors by consulting them
from the beginning.
b. A device for reinforcing the image and status of first line
supervisors
.
Step Two- -After preparing a comprehensive listing of points
raised by the supervisors, four three-man Proposal Drafting Boards
were appointed to work under the direction of the Management Team
Coordinator. These Boards were made up oi two ungraded foremen
and one graded supervisor of unit employees. Care was taken to
ensure the Board's membership was diversified by organizational
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component to develop a maximum cross-fertilization of thinking.
These Boards were responsible for:
1. Drafting formal contract proposals incorporating the points
raised by the supervisors in Step One. Each Board was allocated
specific articles and sections by distributing equal shares of
the comprehensive listing of points.
2. Drafting alternate proposals where possible.
3t Ranking of proposals by priority as follows:
(a) Mandatory--worth going all the way to impasse.
(b) Highly Desirable- -would significantly enhance
operations and/or labor relations.
(c) Nice to Have—would improve operations /labor relations
but not worth a major management effort.
Step Three - -Once the Proposal Drafting Boards had completed
their first drafts they were scheduled to present these drafts to
the Phase I Review Board. This was an eleven-man Review Board
under the chairrncmship of the Negotiating Team Coordinator and
was composed as follows:
1. Three members of the negotiating team.
2. Three Department Directors of the unit employees.
3. Five personnel specialists from the Personnel Office,
The Phcise I Review Board was deliberately kept "lean and mean"
limiting its size. As each Proposal Drafting Board presented its
draft, the Review Board had as its mandate:
1. Act as a first cut "murder board."
2. Check drafts for conflict with regulations.
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3. Check drafts against precedents.
4. Review for operational feasibility.
5<, Review for clarity.
6. Send back for rewrite as required.
Approximately 50 per cent of the Proposal Drafting Boards
'
drafts cleared the Phase I Board on first review,
Step_J[our" -After the Phase I Review Board had completed their
review and all drafts had cleared them, the Board was expanded and
convened as the Phase II Review Board under the chairmanship of
the Chief Spokesman, the Executive Officer. In addition to the
eleven members of thePhase I Board, the Phase II Board was expanded
to include:
1. All members of the Management Negotiating Team.
2. All Division Directors and/or key supervisor's of unit
personnel
„
3. The Director and Deputy Director ot the Personnel
Office.
By this time, the more obvious problems with early proposals had
been weeded out and reworked during Phase I Review. The Phase II
Review Board would concentrate on the following:
1. Elimination of subtle technical and operational nuances
which still existed.
2. Ensuring maximum opportunity for key personnel to express
their viewpoints and maintain their involvement.
3. Providing an in-depth background to the Negotiating Team
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on the rationale and specific past incidents supporting the pro-
posals as written*
Less than 20 per cent of the early drafts were sent back for
rework by the Phase II Board e
Step Five- "The semifinal review was made by the Phase III
Review Board. This Board was chaired by the Commanding Officer and
consisted of all members of the Phase II Board plus the Planning
Officer. The Phase III Board served primarily as a panel of ex-
perts to answer any questions the Commanding Officer might have
and as a Command Strategy Board, At this stage in preparations
the various "fall back" positions were discussed, alternative pro-
posals v/ere confirmed, and ranking of the priorities for each pro-
posal was established.
.Step... S lx° -The final "Board" was the Commanding Officer.
Having chaired the Phase III Board, he was prepared to make the
final Command decisions and to establish the precept guidelines
for the Chief Spokesman and members of the Management Negotiating
Team.
The advantages that accrued from preparing for the
negotiations in the step-by- step manner listed above were numerous
and are noted as follows:
1. By starting with the supervisors, their support of the
final contract Was strengthened and their detailed knowledge oi
the operating environment ensured that the end result, the con-
tract, coincided with operating reality,,
2. By gradually expanding the number of personnel involved at
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each step, the total man-days involved was kept to a minimum con-
sistent with the requirement at each level of review. The plan
was structured to provide a maximum of twenty-eight key personnel
at any single meeting after the supervisor's initial meetings--
yet the benefits of having all supervisors involved at one or more
times were achieved. By taking care to assign supervisors to dif-
ferent groups or phases, it was possible to maintain a healthy
balance of key people "on the job*"
3. The plan provided a graduated review structure of ascend-
ing management levels in an iterative process to minimize the time
that top management involvement would be required. Yet top manage-
ment was not isolated from the viewpoint of first level supervisors.
4. The procedure was established to prepare management's pro-
posals prior to receipt of the union's proposal. By having an ex-
perienced team ,; in being" at the time the union's proposal was
received, it was possible to review and analyze the proposal in a
rapid, professional manner.
5. Having all supervisors assigned to established groups and/
or boards made it possible to convene these personnel on short
notice for the purpose of rewriting proposals during negotiations
as necessary, consultation on strategy, and for briefing them on
progress of negotiations.
6. F5_nally, the concept proved to be a highly valuable super-
visory training medium.
Once all of management's positions had been finalized in
smooth draft form, they were ready for typing as part of an entire
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contract package. All of the proposals were typed in the smooth
copy for use by the Negotiating Team as counter proposals to be
offered at the negotiating table.
The Union's Contrac t Proposals
The entire process of drafting management's position was
completed prior to receipt of the union's proposals. On the day
the union presented their contract package, the Phase II Board
was reconvened to conduct an in-depth analysis of the union's de-
mands and bump them against the management positions that had
already been established. By use of a projector, each of the
union's proposals was projected on a screen and a round table dis-
cussion of each of their points was made possible. In several
instances it was found necessary to redraft management's earlier
proposals based on the close review of the union's proposals. How-
ever, the earlier preparations had been sufficiently thorough that
the amount of rewriting was minimal and most of that final week of
preparation was devoted to preparations of negotiating handbooks
for the Management Negotiating Team in which the reasons supporting
each of management's positions were summarized in great detail. A
book of authoritative reference material was also prepared and
annotated to provide ready access by the Team.
The Union's proposals were poorly written and in many cases
incomplete. The union had obviously copied their proposals from
other contracts and had not bothered to change many of the terms
used in the wording. For example, some terms and phrases used in
a shipyard contract would not be applicable to a Naval Supply
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Center contract. Management V7as rather pleased to find that the
union had not done its "homework." Management's strategy was to
substitute their proposals for the unions and bargain over them
during the negotiations. With the union's proposal being so poorly
written, management felt that the substitution would be easy.
Some of the demands included in the union's proposals
were considered farfetched. For example, they did not want to
work in the warehouses if the temperature outside was over 90 or
below 32°. Another proposal asked that each man be given a day
off on his birthday. The union also asked that the workweek be
made a standard Monday through Friday, eight to four-thirty shift.
Any work outside these hours should be considered overtime. Other
requests were for more stewards; that management would automatically 1
select the top man on the eligibility list for promotion; that
each union official be given a parking space near his work area;
that the union be furnished a large office space; that the union
be represented at all management planning conferences ; and that all
paychecks be delivered to members of the unit by eight-thirty on
payday
.
In addition to the group review with the supervisors,
management applied several other tests to each of the union's pro-
posals. These tests were as follows:
1. Is the proposal reasonable? Is it necessary?




3. Could we live with the proposal as presented? What part
of it? In modified form?
4. What are its implications in terms of cost to the activity?
b. Could it reasonably be expected to bring about an im-
provement of some kind in activity operations or employee-manage-
relationship?
6. If a change in current policy or procedure is proposed,
is the proposal designed to overcome some actual difficulty that
has been encountered?
7. Could it have Navy-wide implications?
One of the primary general objectives of the negotiating
process was the deliberate and objective airing of issues and
policies of concern to unit employees. Management felt that the
negotiations should result in an agreement which established a
constructive and cooperative labor-management relationship. The
nature of the negotiation process is such, however, that it was
not possible to set hard and fast rules of procedure which would
guarantee success. Management has done as much "homework" as
possible, and now the success of the negotiations was left to the
personality and the skill of the negotiating team.
At the Negotiating Table
The Negotiating Team received final instructions from the
Commanding Officer and the negotiations began. The word passed on
to the Team by the Commanding Officer was that management's chief
spokesman could agree to the sections as had been approved by him,
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but any significant difference in the phraseology was to be re-
viewed by him before acceptance. Also, before any major changes
were made to any of the previously approved management positions,
the chief spokesman was required to hold a caucus and convene the
review boards for a last look at the new proposal before commit-
ting management. While this reduced the flexibility of the chief
spokesman in the negotiating room, it had a favorable effect of
making sure that the operating man could live with the changed
wording and made sure that there were no hidden "hookers" in the
wording that might not have been caught during the heat of
battle.
Management's chief spokesman, NSC's Executive Officer,
was a quiet, deliberate individual who always smoked a pipe. It
was impossible to "shake" him and cause him to make any irrational
statements. He would listen to the union negotiators threaten
and accuse management of wrong doings without any expression--
only puffs from his pipe. After the union had thoroughly talked
out their position on a point, which was often based upon con-
flicting statements because each member of the union negotiating
team was allowed to talk, he would inject management's position.
He proved to be so "cool" and so positive in his approach to
management's position that the union had to change their chief
spokesman four times before getting someone who could negotiate
on equal terms with management. The union started with a local
MTC representative as chief spokesman, than an International Re-
presentative for the East Coast tried it. He was replaced by the
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President of the Area MTC who was shortly relieved by a special
negotiator from the National Headquarters. This man had just
finished negotiating a contract for the garbage collectors in New
York City which ended a long strike. He was extremely capable
and negotiations started to become productive.
The new union chief spokesman adopted the same rule that
management had all along and that was that no one talked during
negotiations except the chief spokesman. If any negotiating team
member wanted to make a point, he would pass it to the chief spokes-
man or call for a caucus. This technia^e was extremely successful
for management and appear to work for the union insomuch as it
eliminated the open disagreement which was evident earlier.
The management team was successful in focusing the dis-
cussion on management's counterproposals rather than the language
drafted by the union. Negotiating on the basis of management
language made it easier to portray employee-management problems
as management saw them, thus placing the union in a position where
it had to review its proposals not entirely in the perspective of
what its membership wanted, but through the eyes of management and
in relation to problems management was interested in solving.
This tactic enhanced the prospects for a satisfactory and work-
able agreement.
As soon as a meeting of the minds was achieved on a sub-
ject under discussion, it was initialed by each chief spokesman
and dated. A copy was made so that each team could maintain a
file of agreed upon contract language. Those sections over which
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agreement could not be reached were held not oe reached were held
back for discussion later.
After following a five day, eight hour a day negotiating
schedule, the negotiations reached the three month cut-off date
for "on the clock" negotiations with only two items remaining to
be signed oft. The union won a one week extension from the Com-
manding Officer and at the end of this period and after two late
night negotiating sessions, all items were signed off.
Management was successful in winning every point it de-
sired to have included in the new contract. Actually, very little
wording ended up different than was proposed by management. This
success can be attributed to the tactics and techniques used
during the negotiations by management's negotiating team. The
tactics and techniques used are listed as follows, along with a
discussion covering the purpose and justification for each item:
1
.
Do not talk down or look down on employee negotiators.
A friendly, matter-of-fact, equal status attitude was taken toward
the union negotiators. Unless the union negotiators feel that
they are being treated with the courtesy and respect befitting
their status as employee representatives and spokesmen, any exist-
ing tendency to be suspicious, truculent, and stubborn in nego-
tiations will be intensified. The management negotiators, of
course, are entitled to the same courtesy and respect.
2. Use the caucus. The responses which management gave to
union proposals or issues raised during negotiating sessions were
often the product of joint effort in caucus by the negotiating
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team and others in the ranks of activity management who had been
consulted. Under normal conditions it is the spokesman's re-
sponsibility to sense the trend of the discussion, to determine
timing, and to make a response to the union's assertions or pro-
posals which is consistent v;ith management's objectives and is
based on his and the team's judgment as to the applicability of a
predetermined management position to the particular issue at hand.
3. Proceed "with all deliberate speed." Management's evident
sincerity in wanting to finish negotiations, sign the agreement,
and get it into operation without unnecessary delay demonstrated
its good faith to the employee organization and to rank and file
employees. Characteristically, negotiation time is a time of un-
settled morale. Employees are wondering what the outcome of the
bargaining will be in terms of changed programs and practices,
and just how much the union will succeed in achieving for them.
This uncertainty sometimes shows up in on-the-job performance, and
productivity may suffer.
4. Resist "it's already been agreed to" tactic. In many
cases the proposals submitted to management are taken from guide-
line agreements furnished by union headquarters, or copies from
portions of agreements negotiated at other activities. Proposed
articles or clauses that originate in this way often fail to
adequately reflect or address themselves to the local situation,
and this can cause problems for the negotiators on both sides of
the table.
Unions often feel they are on strong ground in proposing
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a section or article which has already been incorporated into an
agreement negotiated at a similar activity. Sometimes they are
right. But just because a provision has been agreed upon at one
naval shipyard- -or even at four or five- -it docs not necessarily
follow that it should be accepted by management at the next one.
Contract language drafted to accomplish a particular objective or
overcome a particular problem at one activity may do more harm
than good if adopted at another where underlying conditions are
somewhat different, and where other objectives and problems should
be receiving attention instead,
Each union proposal should be considered on its merits.
If a proposal is clearly relevant in terms of conditions at the
activity and in the unit represented by the local union involved,
it should receive serious consideration. On the other hand, a
proposal which has simply been "cribbed" from another activity's
agreement need not take up much negotiating time unless the union
can justify it convincingly in relation to local conditions,
problems or needs.
5. Do not give rise to false ho pes. In discussing specific
union proposals, one had to keep in mind the employees* "area of
expectation." When negotiating begins, the employee organization
knows full well that it is not going to get everything it asks.
It has usually deliberately loaded its proposals in order to pro-
vide leeway for compromise. But it does have an area of expecta-
tion, a zone within which an offer from management will meet the
rank and file's current aspirations.
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The important thing is not to expand this area of ex-
pectation, by any word or act. For this reason, management ne-
gotiators should be exceedingly careful of the comments they make
in each specific proposal. For the same reason, management's
counterproposal must be made with care. Should management indi-
cate either by comment or counterproposal that it is willing to
grant materially more than the employee organization or its rank
and file expected, then the hopes of one or both are raised to new
levels and thereafter it becomes more difficult for the employee
organization to reconcile itself to accepting less.
6 . Do not make commitments you do not intend to keep. The
broken word frequently lies at the bottom of unsatisfactory ne-
gotiations. This applies even when the commitments are hypothetical
The future is so uncertain that even the most unlikely of events
can occur. Activity negotiators and their fellow management
officials, understanding this, should make commitments with care--
and should reconcile themselves to living with all provisions in
the agreement, including those which may later begin to look like
mistakes.
Unkept commitments undermine the force and authority of
the entire agreement. If management does not set an example in
standing behind the agreement, it cannot expect respect from the
employee organization. In the long run the creation of a mutual
respect for the agreement, and a mutual determination that it must
be lived with, will benefit the activity far more than any
temporary advantage that might be gained by violating or ignoring
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one of its provisions, no matter hovz onerous that provision has
turned out to be.
/. Do not misrepresent or whitewash facts. If management is
wrong, there should be no hesitancy in acknowledging this fact.
If the employee organization is right, do not be afraid to say so.
Vtfhen the facts are not immediately available to prove whether a
union allegation is right or wrong, suspend judgment and postpone
discussion of the issue until the facts can be investigated and
checked. An important part of management's job is to bring the
facts to light at the negotiating table. That simple accomplish-
ment alone can do more to counter unreasonable employee proposals
and eliminate emotional antipathy toward Navy management than any
amount of official oratory.
Further, it does not pay to whitewash facts which place
management in an ignoble light. The employees and supervisors
who will have to work with the agreement on a day-to-day basis are
much more interested in results than in excuses. When the facts
reveal management to be in the wrong, the only course open to
management is to take prompt steps to remedy the wrong and to make
sure that it will not recur. No better evidence of good faith and
honest intentions can be presented to the employee organization.
8. Support your stand with reason. It takes very little
thought or effort to say "No" to an employee organization , But
in labor-management negotiation, "No" by itself is never enough.
If management says "No," the men across the table are entitled to
know why and the why must consist ot fact, or logic, or both.
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If management cannot accept a union proposal or accede to
a union request, it is generally possible to convey that fact in a
more positive and palatable manner, in terms of a counterproposal
or an explanation of the problem faced by management. At any
rate, good faith bargaining requires that the management team have
reasons to support any position it takes. It also means that
management representatives must be willing to listen to the union's
views and to reconsider their own position in light of what they
hear. And, of course, it means the same thing for the union.
9» Explain, describe, illustrate. Union and management ne-
gotiators view any given issue from different standpoints. Like
two people looking at a work of sculpture from different angles,
each sees the subject differently. This creates communication
problems that management negotiators must learn to recogni.ze and
work to overcome.
When the management spokesman is making a point, he should
try to express himself in such a way that every member of the union
team will understand what he is saying. It is not necessary to
"talk down" to the union in order to do this, but it is necessary
to develop a feeling for the type of oral presentation that will
strike a responsive chord on the other side of the table. Talk-
ing, even talking all day, will be futile unless the talker is
"getting through."
No union representative will agree to a management pro-
posal that he is not sure he understands. When he understands
fully what management is saying he may still be opposed but that
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understanding must first be obtained before any progress can be
made on obtaining his agreement.
When it appears to the management spokesman that he has
failed to get across his point, he should alter his approach some-
what and try again. Descriptions, examples, and illustrations
will help. Patience will help too. Successful communication must
be achieved, for this is the key to successful negotiation.
10. Be calm, patient, tolerant. Emotion often blinds men to
reason and will usually beget an emotional reaction from the other
party involved. Feelings may well run high from time to time
during the course of negotiations, but it should be remembered
that no satisfactory agreement can be written when emotionalism
prevails on both sides of the table. When it dominates the ap-
proach of one side, the other side will probably emerge with the
better terms. For this reason a union will occasionally attempt
to induce an emotional reaction on the management side of the
table as a negotiating tactic.
Occasionally, however, employee negotiators may become so
emotional that it grows apparent that nothing further will be
accomplished without a marked change in the climate within the
conference room. It is desirable to hear the union out, if
possible, on any subject about which it feels strongly, as long
as its statements do not become abusive. When an opportunity pre-
sents itself, the management spokesman can then suggest a recess,
or even termination of that day's session. When the parties get
together again the next day or next week, the topic can usually be
brought up again with much less risk of emotional outbursts.
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The management team should avoid shows of emotion and
should react with patience and tolerance to those of the other
side. When questions are asked of the union negotiators, they
should be phrased in such a way as to elicit information rather
than emotion. Negotiations should be tackled in a businesslike
way, as calmly and objectively as possible.
11. Do not "let sleeping dogs lie." This phrase covers
situations where significant issues, having been temporarily set
aside, have not been brought back to the bargaining table before
the agreement is completed; where it is obvious that the union's
concept of the actual meaning of an agreed-upon clause differs
from management's interpretation of it; or where issues have been
wrangled back and forth inconclusively and the subject is dropped
without management clearly stating where it stands when all the
argumentation has ended.
These "sleeping dogs" all too frequently wake up. And
when they do, they growl and they bite. For careless negotiation
practices leave loose ends and uncertainties in the negotiators'
minds. Each such loose end and uncertainty can create grievances
and further bickering after the agreement is signed. This is par-
ticularly true when the parties have incorporated a section or
clause in the agreement without having reached a full meeting oi
the minds as to its intended meaning and application.
Of course, it sometimes happens that the union negotiators,
after pressing a certain proposal, will agree to set it aside for
later reconsideration and then fail to mention it again. This may

69
indicate a desire to drop the proposal, and it is often wise for
management to simply let it go at that. Considerable sensitivity
and insight is needed to distinguish this type of situation from
the dangerous one in which a potentially troublesome issue is left
lying on the table with management's position unstated.
12. Be careful of "final" offers. Don't be pushed into calling
a proposal or offer "final" unless you really mean it. Your final
word must reflect your awareness of all alternatives and conse-
quences. If it does not, you may be creating an unnecessary im-
passe with all the exasperation of temper and explosive possibili-
ties that any seemingly irreconcilable conflict creates. Further,
if "final" offers turn out to be something less than final, the
union will soon be convinced that management does not mean what it
says. And when management does take a final stand, the union,
believing that management, as usual, holds another offer in re-
serve, will refuse to compromise. Result: a stalemate.
It is best, therefore, to avoid a "final" proposal except
where any further modification of management's stand would put it
in a position which is clearly untenable or contrary to some legal
or regulatory requirement. Before making an authentically final
offer, management should have thought through the consequences of
the employee organization's possible refusal to accept it and have
decided that these consequences can be borne. If there is a
possibility that the issue may be submitted to fact finding or
mediation, management should be sure that the position it takes
will stand up under close scrutiny by an impartial third party.
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A large ceremony was held to celebrate the signing of the
contract agreement. It was a hard fought battle and both sides
were glad it was over.
After the signing, management set up a training program
for supervisory personnel. The training sessions were conducted
by members of the negotiating team. The training covered all
significant provisions, with emphasis on those which required a
change from current practice. The role of the union steward, and
the importance of establishing a businesslike supervisor-steward
relationship, were also covered.
Management was ready to observe the results of a union
contract which had been built by the involvement and hard work of
an interested management force.

CHARIER V
RESULTS OF THE NAVAL SUPPLY CENTER CHARLESTON
NEGOTIATING METHOD
The new union contract agreement has been in effect nov;
for a period of one year. The results based upon the number of
grievances submitted indicates that it is an extremely good agree-
ment. Table 1 reflects the number of grievances submitted under
the old agreement and under the new agreement.
TABLE 1







First Step 109 131 5
Second Step 65 87
Third Step 27 32
Arbitration 1 2
Source: Employee Relations Division, NSC Charleston,
March, 1970.
The decline in the number of grievances submitted under
the new agreement is a drastic reduction compared to the previous
agreement. This decrease is attributed directly to the prepara-




management negotiating team and the use of o^ly those v7ords and
phrases in the agreement that were clearly understood by both
sides.
The extensive preparation by management prior to the
start of negotiations not only prepared the members of the ne-
gotiating team but also enlightened the supervisors in the area
of union negotiations. They had an opportunity to express their
feelings regarding the old contract and help prepare the countee-
proposals for the new contract. This knowledge has not left them
and is now being put to use on a day-by-day basis in their deal-
ings with the union. The union agreement is no longer a confusing
document causing arguments over the reason for a certain section,
but is used as a guide for action by both the union and management
as new and different situations arise.
The management negotiating team did an outstanding job in
winning all the major points that management wanted in the new
agreement. The tactics and techniques used by management's team
permitted the union to fully state their positions and sometimes
their complaints. Once the union had spoken, the management team
clearly stated their position as well as taking corrective action
that could be taken applicable to any legitimate union complaints.
At the conclusion of the negotiations, the union was absolutely
clear on every position of management and was fully aware of
management's reasoning behind each section in the agreement. The
union officials gained trust in management during the negotiations
which is still evident today.
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Use of clearly definable words and phrases in the agree-
ment was a key objective which was carried out during the
negotiations o A large portion of the grievances submitted under
the old agreement was because the union was interpreting the
agreement in one way and management in another. Such wording as
allowing union stewards a "reasonable" amount of work time to
conduct union business was eliminated and replaced with a maximum
number of hours per week allowed. To monitor the number of hours
spent on union business each week, the union officials are required
to sign out of their work area and in at the work area of the
member being contacted In addition to limiting the number of
hours off the job, this technique also allows management a way to
price-out the true union off -the- job cost.
Needless to say, management at NSC, Charleston, is elated




The purpose of negotiations is to reach agreement. Since
labor and management invariably approach the negotiation process
with conflicting objectives and conflicting viewpoints, reaching
agreement seldom comes easy. Nevertheless, thousands of labor-
management agreements are successfully negotiated and renegotiated
every year without becoming bogged down in the type of deadlocks
which produce headlines about the failure of the parties to reach
a meeting of the minds.
NSC Charleston went through an elaborate preparation cycle
which included all supervisors that were involved with the union.
Along with the preparation cycle, the top-notch ability of the
management negotiating team contributed to the success of the new
contract. The new contract is working as is evident by the
dramatic reduction in the number of grievances which have been
submitted.
The union was forced to change their chief spokesman four
times before any progress was made at the negotiating table.
This is a flexibility not available to the management team. The
union can continue to ask their headquarters for a different




The management negotiating team received no guidance from
the Washington level except when specific questions were asked.
All negotiable options were left to the discretion of the Command-
ing Officer. Needless to say, all options received close personal
scrutiny of the Commanding Officer and were approved by him before
any agreement was initialed off at the negotiating table.
It is recognized that the negotiating procedures at NSC
Charleston will not suit the needs of all activities. The methods
suitable to a particular activity may be simpler or more complex
depending on such factors as the union involved, the past history
of relations with the union, whether the contract is a first or a
renegotiation and the availability of supervisors and personnel
experts.
The lessons learned at NSC Charleston would suggest the
following recommendations be applied to the entire union ne-
gotiating process:
1. Get all the supervisors Involved. First and foremost is
the inclusion of all supervisors in the negotiation preparation
cycle. All of the preparation in the world will be useless if the
end result does not coincide with the realities of the operating
world.
2. Recognize the present and potential problems. Usually
problems come to light through grievances. Management should be
fully aware of all grievances entertained, especially by the
supervisors at the first step, and the reasons behind the grievances
To know the reasons allows management an opportunity to plan a
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solution to the problems, if not under the present contract, then
through the new contract when renegotiated.
3« Communicate It is important to know what other activities
have done in the area of labor relations. Each command should
exchange union contracts, problems, and positions. To know what
the other activities are doing allows you to be better prepared
and also helps prevent the establishment of any farfetched
precedents in new contracts.
4 • Establish systemwide guidance at the Washington level on
contract positions. At the present time, negotiation of union
contracts is left to the prerogative of each Commanding Officer.
The headquarters in Washington only provides assistance when
asked. In the case of Charleston, the Commanding Officer was ex-
tremely interested and, as a result, the union gained very little
at the expense of the Government. However, for those activities
where the Commanding Officer is not interested in cost savings or
not interested in general, the union can make major gains which
will not be easy to overcome in the future. For example, paying
overtime for any work beyond a normal day shift or a paid holiday
on each member's birthday. Guidance should be furnished to each
activity from the V/ashington level to guide negotiating teams in
the major cost areas.
5 . Establi sh a labor relations training team at the Washing to
n
level for field activities. Charleston picked the best qualified
personnel available in the command as members of the negotiating
team. All other work was put aside and the negotiations came
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first. The members were clever enough to educate themselves on
the techniques of negotiating a contract. A training course would
have been of great value. Many activities cannot afford to drop
everything and put their best people on the negotiating team.
Since very few management personnel have ever had any negotiating
experience, a training team is essential. It should be established
at the Washington level for training both civilian and military
personnel. The training should be in classrooms since much of the
information passed out would not be for union consumption. This
recommendation is certainly one which should be implemented without
delay.
In addition, it is recommended that NSC Charleston docu-
ment their entire negotiating method in detail. Since the ef-
fectiveness of their negotiations is now evident by the number of
grievances submitted, they are in a strong position to convince
other activities that their approach is one that works. Also,
members of their negotiating team should be made available to
other activities as consultants on matters relating to negotiating
an agreement. There are very few experienced management negotiators}
therefore, NSC Charleston has a product that will be demanded by
others
.
It is important that the above recommendations be con-
sidered because the union is continuing to grow, the unions demands
are becoming increasingly strong, and the union hostility and
militancy are increasing. Management's rights are continuing to
be eroded. If management does not prepare itself, true command
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